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1. A Pre-Revolutionary Situation? 
 
When all the data and arguments are in, will the recent flurry of work in embodied 
cognition deliver a revolutionary paradigm shift in the sciences and philosophy of 
mind? Or will it be a case of business as usual in the mind-targeting laboratories and 
armchairs around the globe?  Or is the most likely outcome a reformist tweak in 
which embodied cognition research is recognized as making genuine and important 
methodological or orienting contributions to cognitive science, while leaving the 
most fundamental conceptual foundations of the field intact – as Rupert nicely puts 
it in his sobering set of conclusions regarding the revolutionary implications of 
embodied approaches in general, ‘more of a nudging than a coup’ (Rupert 2009: 
242)? 
 
Reaching a judgment on this issue is trickier than it may at first appear, since it is not 
simply a matter of working out whether or not some homogeneous and well-
delineated new research programme in cognitive science has succeeded, or will 
succeed, in substantively reforming, or even deposing, the orthodox view in the 
field. (For present purposes, the orthodox view may be located by its adherence to 
the principle that intelligent thought and action are standardly to be explained in 
terms of the building and manipulation of inner representational states by inner 
computational processes.) Indeed, if we consider the assortment of thinkers who 
congregate under the banner of embodied cognition, and we reflect on the range of 
theoretical approaches on offer, it turns out that they constitute a far from univocal 
crowd.  Because of this, my goal in this chapter is not to pronounce on the future 
prospects for embodied cognition research in general – that would require at least 
one book – but rather to evaluate the prospects for a limited number of specific but 
prominent views that march under that banner. In each case I shall endeavour to get 
clear about the fundamental theoretical commitments of the view in relation to a 
specific diagnostic issue, namely what its advocates mean by the presumably 
foundational notion of being ‘embodied’.  
 
2. The Implementational Body 
 
2 
 
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (ExC), there are actual (in this 
world) cases of intelligent thought and action in which the thinking and thoughts 
(more precisely, the material vehicles that realize the thinking and thoughts) are 
spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external 
(beyond-the-skull-and-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded cognitive status.1 
To bring ExC into proper view, it is useful to compare it with an adjacent position in 
intellectual space, namely the hypothesis of embedded cognition. According to this 
second and arguably less radical position, intelligent thought and action are 
regularly, and perhaps sometimes necessarily, causally dependent on the bodily 
exploitation of certain external props or scaffolds.2 So, consider the example of a 
mathematical calculation achieved, in part, through the bodily manipulation of pen 
and paper. For both the embedded view and ExC, what we have here is a brain-
body-pen-and-paper system involving a beyond-the-skin element that, perhaps 
among other things, helps to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of 
simpler ones (e.g. by acting as storage for intermediate calculations). For the 
embedded theorist, however, even if it is true that the overall mathematical problem 
could not have been solved, at least by some particular mathematician, without the 
use of pen and paper, nevertheless the external resource in play retains the status of 
a noncognitive aid to some internally located thinking system. It certainly does not 
qualify as a proper part of the cognitive architecture itself. In other words, the 
thinking in evidence remains a resolutely inner, paradigmatically neural, 
phenomenon, although one that has been given a performance boost by its local 
technological ecology. By contrast, for the advocate of ExC, the coupled system of 
pen-and-paper resource, appropriate bodily manipulations, and in-the-head 
processing may itself count as a cognitive architecture, even though it is a 
dynamically assembled (rather than hard-wired) and essentially temporary (rather 
than persisting) coalition of elements. In other words, each of the differently located 
components of this distributed (over brain, body and world) multi-factor system 
enjoys cognitive status, where the term ‘cognitive status’ should be understood as 
indicating whatever status it is that we ordinarily grant the brain in mainstream 
cognitive science. Another way to put this is to say that, according to the embedded 
view, the dependence of cognition of environmental factors is ‘merely’ causal, 
whereas, according to ExC, that dependence is constitutive (Adams and Aizawa 
2008). 
 
                                                 
1 The still-canonical presentation of ExC is by Clark and Chalmers (1998). Clark’s 
own more recent treatment may be found in (Clark 2008b). For a field-defining 
collection that places the original Clark and Chalmers paper alongside a range of 
developments, criticisms and defences of the notion of extended cognition, see 
(Menary 2010). 
2 The case for embedded cognition has been made repeatedly. For just two of the 
available philosophical treatments, see (Clark 1997, Wheeler 2005). 
3 
 
ExC naturally qualifies as a species of embodied cognition, because it takes non-
neural bodily factors (e.g. manipulative movements of the body) to be parts of the 
realizing substrate of cognitive phenomena. Given our present remit, however, it is 
instructive to bring out the precise nature of the style of embodiment that is on offer. 
Here is an orienting thought. Surprisingly, perhaps, the possibility of extended 
cognition is a straightforward consequence of what still deserves to be labelled the 
house philosophy of mind in cognitive science, namely functionalism. The cognitive-
scientific functionalist holds that what makes a state or process cognitive is not its 
material composition, but the functional role it plays in generating psychological 
phenomena, by intervening causally between systemic inputs, systemic outputs and 
other functionally identified, intrasystemic states and processes. Computational 
explanations, as pursued in, say, cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence (AI), 
are functionalist, in this sense.  Of course, historically, the assumption in cognitive 
science has been that the organized collection of states and processes that the 
functionalist takes to be the machinery of mind will be realized by the nervous 
system (or, in hypothetical cases of minded robots or aliens, whatever the 
counterpart of the nervous system inside the bodily boundaries of those cognitive 
agents turns out to be). In truth, however, there isn’t anything in the letter of 
functionalism that mandates this internalism (Wheeler 2010a, b).  After all, what 
functionalism demands is that we specify the causal relations that exist between 
some target element and a certain set of systemic inputs, systemic outputs and other 
functionally identified, intrasystemic elements. Nothing here demands internalism, 
since the boundaries of the functionally identified system of interest – i.e., the 
cognitive system – may in principle fall beyond boundaries of the organic sensory-
motor interface.  
 
Clark (2008a, b; followed by Wheeler 2010a, b, 2011a) uses the term extended 
functionalism to describe the combination of functionalism and ExC. This moniker is 
useful, as long as one remembers that the qualification ‘extended’ attaches to the 
nature of cognition and not to the thesis of functionalism. Nothing about that 
venerable philosophical thesis has changed, since the claim that cognition might be 
extended merely unpacks one implication of the functionalist picture that had been 
there all along. As one might put it, ExC, if true, is simply a footnote to 
functionalism. If we look at things from the other direction, however, the alliance 
with functionalism gives the ExC theorist something she needs – assuming, that is, 
that she wants to hold onto the presumably attractive thought that the very same 
type-identified cognitive process may, on some occasions, take place wholly inside 
the head, while on others it may take place in an extended brain-body-environment 
system. To explain: even if some mathematical calculations are simply too difficult 
for me to complete entirely in my brain, there are others for which it seems plausible 
to say that although, on Monday, I may carry them out using pen and paper, on 
Thursday I may call only on my organic resources. Now, if we are to describe these 
alternative problem-solving routines as two realizations of the very same 
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mathematical cognition, it must be possible for the very same psychological 
reasoning process to enjoy (at least) two different material instantiations. In other 
words, the target cognitive phenomenon must be multiply realizable. And while 
functionalism may not be necessary for multiple realizability, it is standardly 
thought to be sufficient, since a function is something that enjoys a particular kind of 
independence from its implementing material substrate. Indeed, it seems plausible 
that anything worthy of being a function must, in principle, be multiply realizable.3 
 
Functionalism makes extended cognition a conceptual possibility, but it doesn’t 
make ExC true. What is needed, additionally, is an account of which functional 
contributions count as cognitive contributions and which don’t. After all, as the 
critics of ExC have often observed, there undoubtedly will be functional differences 
between a distributed system and a purely inner system that allegedly realize the 
same cognitive process. For example, our brain-body-pen-and-paper mathematical 
system involves visual access to, and the bodily manipulation of, the material 
symbols on the page. At some level of functional description, there will be aspects of 
these processes that have no counterparts in the purely inner case (e.g. the functions 
involved in controlling visual gaze). So we will need to know which, if any, of the 
functional differences in evidence are relevant to determining the cognitive (or 
otherwise) status of the external elements. In other words, we need to provide a mark 
of the cognitive (Adams and Aizawa 2008), a scientifically informed account of what it 
is to be a proper part of a cognitive system that, so as not to beg any questions, is 
independent of where any candidate element happens to be spatially located 
(Wheeler 2010a, b, 2011a, b). The idea is that once a mark of the cognitive is 
specified, further philosophical and empirical leg-work will be required to find out 
where cognition (so conceived) falls – in the brain, in the non-neural body, in the 
environment, or, as ExC predicts will sometimes be the case, in a system that extends 
across all of these aspects of the world 
 
To see how this might work, let’s consider a candidate for a functionalist-friendly 
mark of the cognitive (Wheeler 2011a). Newell and Simon famously claimed that a 
suitably organized ‘physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means 
for general intelligent action’ (Newell and Simon 1976: 116). A physical symbol 
system (henceforth PSS) is (roughly) a classical computational system instantiated in 
the physical world, where a classical computational system is (roughly) a system in 
which atomic symbols are combined and manipulated by structure sensitive 
processes in accordance with a language-like combinatorial syntax and semantics. 
Although Newell and Simon adopted what we might call an unrestricted form of the 
claim that cognition (which I am taking to be equivalent to ‘the necessary and 
                                                 
3 In this chapter I assume that the notion of multiple realizability is clear and in good 
order, but I note that not everyone shares my confidence (see e.g. Shapiro 2000, 
Milcowski 2013).     
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sufficient means for general intelligent action’) is a matter of classical symbol 
manipulation, one might reasonably restrict the claim to a narrower range of 
phenomena, perhaps most obviously to ‘high-end’ achievements such as linguistic 
behaviour, natural deduction and mathematical reasoning. And although classical 
cognitive scientists in general thought of the symbol systems in question here as 
being realized inside the head, there is nothing in the basic concept of a PSS that 
rules out the possibility of extended material implementations (cf. the traditional 
move of bolting internalism onto functionalism). What this line of reasoning gives 
us, then, is the claim that ‘being a suitably organized PSS’ is one mark of the 
cognitive.  
 
So what? Bechtel (1996) defends the view that cognitive achievements such as 
mathematical reasoning, natural language processing and natural deduction are (at 
least sometimes) the result of sensorimotor-mediated interactions between internal 
connectionist networks and external symbol systems, where the latter (but not the 
former) feature various forms of combinatorial syntax and semantics. So in these 
cases the combinatorial structure that, if our mark of the cognitive is correct, is 
indicative of cognition, resides not in our internal processing engine, but rather in 
public systems of external representations (e.g. written or spoken language, 
mathematical notations). The capacity of connectionist networks to recognize and 
generalize from patterns in bodies of training data (e.g. large numbers of correct 
derivations in sentential arguments), plus the temporal constraints that characterize 
real embodied engagements with stretches of external symbol structures (e.g. 
different parts of the input will be available to the network at different times, due to 
the restrictions imposed by temporal processing windows) are then harnessed to 
allow those networks to be appropriately sensitive to the constraints of an external 
compositional syntax. One might be tempted to conclude from this that a Bechtel-
style network-plus-symbol-system architecture is an extended PSS. Of course, more 
would need to be said before we should give in wholeheartedly to this temptation 
(Wheeler 2011a). However, let’s assume that any concerns can be addressed. If the 
further thought that I have flirted with is correct, and being a suitably organized PSS 
is a mark of the cognitive, then, by virtue of being an extended PSS, the Bechtel 
architecture is also an extended cognitive system.  
 
There are, then, reasons to think that extended functionalism may deliver ExC. And 
if extended functionalism is a form of embodied cognition, then the future prospects 
for embodied cognition are correspondingly rosy. But however revolutionary a 
result extended functionalism may mandate in relation to where cognition is to be 
found, the fact is that that outcome neither signals a fundamental change in our 
understanding of the relationship between cognition and material embodiment, nor 
(relatedly, as we shall see in a moment) forces us in the direction of a radically new 
theoretical language in which to carry out cognitive science.  
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On the first point, consider that, for the functionalist, and thus for the extended 
functionalist, the physical body is relevant ‘only’ as an explanation of how cognitive 
states and processes are implemented in the material world. Indeed, since multiple 
realizability, as established by functionalism, requires that a single type of cognitive 
state or process may enjoy a range of different material instantiations, there is no 
conceptual room for the specific material embodiment of a particular instantiation to 
be an essential feature of mind. (Although it may be true that some functions can, as 
a matter of empirical fact, be implemented only in certain kinds of extant material 
system, that would be no more than a practical constraint.) So, despite the fact that, 
along one dimension (see above), extended functionalism is a fully paid-up member 
of the embodied cognition fraternity, there is another, arguably more fundamental, 
dimension along which the view emerges as having a peculiarly disembodied 
character. (Here one is reminded of Searle’s observation that functionalism, although 
standardly depicted as a materialist theory of mind, is fully consistent with 
substance dualism (Searle 1980).) This leads us to our second point. In observing that 
functionalism is the house philosophy of mind in orthodox cognitive science, one 
thereby highlights the close theoretical connection that obtains between 
functionalism and representational-computational models of mind. Indeed, the 
traditional account of the relation between a computational virtual machine and the 
range of physical machines in which that virtual machine may be instantiated is a 
particular version of the implementation relation that characterizes functionalist 
multiple realizability, while the notion of a computational system, via research in AI 
and computational cognitive psychology, provides a concrete and scientifically 
productive technological realization of the functionalist schema. It is unsurprising, 
then, that extended functionalism is routinely pursued in a computational register. 
Indeed, arguably the most common proposal for an extended cognitive system 
involves external representational elements that are taken to be constitutive 
components of the cognitive architecture in question precisely because of the way in 
which they are poised to contribute to the (distributed) implementation of an 
information processing solution to some cognitive problem.  Here one might 
mention the canonical example of the linguistic inscriptions in Otto’s notebook that 
allegedly realize the content of his extended dispositional beliefs (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998), but the case above of an extended PSS is an example of the very 
same signature.  
 
If all this is right, then although extended functionalism, through its rejection of 
neuro-centric internalism, may in some ways advance the embodied cause, it 
nonetheless leaves the conventional explanatory language of cognitive science fully 
intact. By analogy with Russian history, this is 1905, not 1917.                  
 
3. The Vital Body  
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Alan Turing once remarked that, ‘[i]n the nervous system chemical phenomena are 
at least as important as electrical’ (Turing 1950: 46). This is a striking comment, 
especially when one recognizes that, even in the connectionist regions of cognitive 
science, where the abstract physical organization of the brain, depicted as a 
distributed network of simple processing units, inspires the abstract structure of the 
cognitive architecture on offer, neural processes are treated as essentially a matter of 
electrical signals transmitted along wires. Connectionist networks are, of course, 
standardly interpreted as computational (and thus as representational) systems, 
even though they often need to be analysed in terms of cognitive functions specified 
at a finer level of grain than those performed by classical computational systems (e.g. 
using mathematical relations between units that do not respect the boundaries of 
linguistic or conceptual thought). In the present context, the importance of this 
interpretation of connectionism is captured by Clark’s (1989) philosophical gloss on 
the field as advocating a ‘microfunctionalist’ account of cognition. As we have seen, 
functionalism demands an implementational notion of embodiment, a fact that 
surely remains unaffected by the ‘micro’ nature of the functional grain appropriate 
to connectionist theorizing. Tying these thoughts together, one might speculate that 
the conceptualization of the brain as an electrical signalling system – a  
conceptualization that depends, in part, on abstracting away from the chemical 
dynamics of the brain – plausibly contributes positively to whatever cogency the 
computationalist-microfunctionalist picture has. So what happens when the 
chemical dynamics of brains are brought into view? Does this herald the arrival of a 
radical notion of embodiment, and thus of embodied cognition, one that brings 
revolution to the door? 
 
To focus on a concrete example, consider reaction-diffusion (RD) systems. These are 
distributed chemical mechanisms involving constituents that are (a) transformed 
into each other by local chemical reactions and (b) spread out in space by diffusion. 
RD systems plausibly explain the kind of behaviour in some unicellular organisms 
(e.g. slime molds) that researchers in the field of artificial life describe as minimally 
cognitive, behaviour such as distinguishing between different relevant 
environmental factors, adapting to environmental change, and organizing collective 
behaviour.  Many of the molecular pathways present in unicellular organisms have 
been conserved by evolution to play important roles in animal brains, so an 
understanding of the ways in which RD systems may generate minimally cognitive 
behaviour will plausibly help us to explain the mechanisms underlying higher-level 
natural cognition. Against this background, Dale and Husbands (2010) show that a 
simulated RD system (conceived as a one-dimensional ring of cells within which the 
concentration of two coupled chemicals changes according to differential equations 
governing within-cell reactions and between-cell diffusion) is capable of intervening 
between sensory input (from whiskers) and motor output (wheeled locomotion) to 
enable a situated robot to achieve the following minimally cognitive behaviours: (i) 
tracking a falling circle (thus demonstrating orientation); (ii) fixating on a circle as 
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opposed to a diamond (thus demonstrating discrimination); (iii) switching from 
circle fixation behaviour to circle avoidance behaviour on the presentation of a 
particular stimulus (thus demonstrating memory).  
 
To see why this result might be thought to have insurrectionary implications, let’s 
introduce Collins’ notion of embrained knowledge. According to Collins, knowledge is 
embrained just when ‘cognitive abilities have to do with the physical setup of the 
brain,’ where the term ‘physical setup’ signals not merely the ‘way neurons are 
interconnected’, but also factors to do with ‘the brain as a piece of chemistry or a 
collection of solid shapes’ (Collins 2000: 182). When deployed to generate minimally 
cognitive behaviour, RD systems, characterized as they are by the exploitation of 
spatio-temporal chemical dynamics, plausibly instantiate such embrained 
knowledge. But what does this tell us? At first sight it might seem that embrained 
knowledge must fail to reward any functionalist (or microfunctionalist) gloss. 
Indeed, given the critical role played by low-level spatio-temporal dynamics in the 
chemistry of the brain, the notion seems to import a radical understanding of the 
relation between cognition and physical embodiment, one that Clark (2008a) calls 
total implementation sensitivity and that Wheeler (2010b, 2011a, 2013) calls vital 
materiality. According to this understanding, bodily factors make a special, non-
substitutable contribution to cognition, meaning that the multiple realizability of the 
cognitive, and thus functionalism, must fail.4  
 
The preceding line of thought is tempting, but ultimately under-motivated. Indeed, 
we need to take care not to allow the phrase ‘have to do with the physical setup of 
the brain’ in Collins’ specification of embrained knowledge to run away with us. 
Multiple realizability does not entail that cognition has nothing to do with the 
physical setup of the brain. How a function is implemented in a physical system may 
have all kinds of interesting implications for cognitive science, especially (but not 
only) in areas such as speed, timing and breakdown profile. For example, let’s 
consider some function that is specified in terms of multiple effects. It may be crucial 
to understanding the precise temporal structure of those effects that we understand 
them to be achieved via a form of volume signalling in the brain, in which tiny 
neuromodulators travel not via neural wiring, but freely diffuse through the brain in 
clouds, pretty much regardless of the surrounding cellular and membrane 
structures. (For further information on such chemical signalling, see e.g. Husbands et 
al. 1998.) All this is consistent with the multiple realizability of the cognitive function 
in question, even if, in certain circumstances, a different implementation would 
result in explanatorily significant differences in the temporal structure of thought or  
behaviour. But if ‘having to do with the physical setup of the brain’ does not 
                                                 
4 Here I explore only one way in which vital materiality might be motivated. For 
critical discussion of certain other routes to that position, see (Wheeler 2010b, 2011a, 
2013). 
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undermine multiple realizability, then it doesn’t necessarily establish the more 
radical relation between cognition and embodiment that was attracting our 
revolution-hunting attention.          
 
4. The Sense-Making Body 
 
Perhaps the seeds of revolution are to be found in a different view of embodiment, 
one that hails ultimately from contemporary European phenomenology (especially 
Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962), but which has had an important influence in some 
regions of embodied cognition research (e.g. Gallagher 2005). From this alternative 
perspective, the body is conceived as the pre-reflective medium by which the world 
is opened up in lived experience as a domain of value and significance. Crucially, 
advocates of this style of embodiment (e.g. Dreyfus 1996) standardly hold that its 
role in our sense-making practices cannot be understood in representational terms. 
Given the plausibility of the general thought that representation is necessary for 
computation, if the sense-making body cannot be understood in representational 
terms, then neither can it be understood in computational terms. So an embodied 
cognitive science built on this notion of embodiment would be a revolutionary threat 
to the received explanatory framework. But how does the challenge to 
representation get off the ground? Exhibit one in this debate is the so-called problem 
of relevance. 
 
Arguably one of the most remarkable capacities that human beings possess is our 
fluid and flexible sensitivity to what is, and what is not, contextually relevant in 
some situation, a capacity which is typically operative, even in the sort of 
dynamically shifting and open-ended scenarios in which we often find ourselves. 
Cognitive science ought to explain this capacity, and do so in a wholly scientific 
manner (i.e., without appeal to some magical, naturalistically undischarged 
relevance detector). This is the problem of relevance, also known (in AI) as the frame 
problem (see e.g. Shanahan 2009).  
 
If one approaches the problem of relevance from the perspective of orthodox 
cognitive science, and thus of any view such as extended functionalism that buys 
into the same fundamental principles, the difficulty manifests itself as the dual 
problem of how to retrieve just those behaviour-guiding internal representations 
that are contextually appropriate, and how to update those representations in 
contextually appropriate ways. But how is the computational agent able to locate the 
relevant, and only the relevant, representations? The natural representationalist 
thought is that context itself should be modelled. In other words, the agent should 
deploy context-specifying representations to determine which of her other stored 
representations are currently relevant. What is wrong with this strategy? According 
to Dreyfus (1990, with more than a nod to Heidegger), the root problem is this: any 
attempt to determine the relevance of representational  structures using other 
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representational structures is an invitation to an infinite regress, since those latter 
representational structures will need to have their own contextual relevance 
specified by further representations. But these new representations will need to have 
their contextual relevance specified by yet further representations, and so on.  
 
Dreyfus’s conclusion is that the problem of relevance is an artefact of 
representationalism (Dreyfus 2008: 358). So whatever neutralizes that problem must 
be nonrepresentational in character. One way to unpack this idea is through 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/1962) notion of the intentional arc, according to which skills 
are not represented, but are realized as contextually situated solicitations by one’s 
environment (Dreyfus 2008: 340). To borrow an example from Gallagher (2008), 
when poised to engage in the action of climbing a mountain, the skilled climber does 
not build a cognitive representation of the mountain and infer from that plus 
additionally represented knowledge of her own abilities that it is climbable by her. 
Rather, from a certain distance, in particular visual conditions, the mountain 
‘simply’ looks climbable to her. Her climbing know-how is ‘sedimented’ in how the 
mountain looks to her. The mountain solicits climbing from her. 
 
Rietveld (2012) puts some flesh on this skeleton, by drawing a distinction between 
different kinds of affordance (Gibson’s term for the possibilities for action presented 
by the environment; Gibson 1979). It is here that the connection with our more 
radical species of embodiment is finally exposed. Given a specific situation, some 
affordances are mere possibilities for action, where ‘mere’ signals the fact that 
although the agent could respond to them, such a response would be contextually 
inappropriate. For example, the table at which I am working affords ‘dancing on top 
of’, but that possibility is not a feature of my current paper-writing context, so right 
now I am not primed to respond to it. Some affordances, however, precisely because 
they are either directly contextually relevant to the task at hand, or have proved to 
be relevant in similar situations in the past, prime us for action by being what 
Rietveld calls bodily potentiating. It is affordances of the latter sort that are identified 
by Rietveld as different kinds of Merleau-Pontian solicitation. Figure solicitations are 
those with which we are actively concerned. For example, in my current paper-
writing context, my keyboard summons typing from me. Ground solicitations are 
those with which we are not currently concerned, but for which we are currently 
bodily potentiated, and which are thus poised to summon us to act. For example, the 
tea cup on my table that is peripheral with respect to my current focus of activity is 
nevertheless a feature of my paper-writing context and so is poised to summon me 
to act in appropriate ways. Human relevance-sensitivity is thus explained by shifting 
affordance landscapes, by varying patterns of active and body-potentiating 
solicitations.  
 
Conceived on the Rietveld model, affordances depend constitutively, at least in part, 
on the kinds of bodies that we have, bodies that can dance, type, grip and lift. So if 
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Dreyfus is right that the skills that explain relevance-sensitivity are realized by our 
nonrepresentational ability to respond to contextually situated solicitations, and if 
that nonrepresentational capacity is essentially embodied in the way suggested by 
Rietveld’s affordance-based analysis, then the notion of embodiment that will 
explain a central feature of cognition is one that will fuel the fires of revolution in 
cognitive science.  
 
So far so good, but if the present conception of embodiment is to have any traction in 
cognitive science, its advocates will need to say rather more about the 
naturalistically acceptable processes that causally explain solicitation and 
summoning. The most developed story here hails from Dreyfus (2008), who suggests 
that the solution lies with something like Freeman’s neurodynamical framework 
(Freeman 2000). According to Freeman, the brain is a nonrepresentational dynamical 
system primed by past experience to actively pick up and enrich significance, a 
system whose constantly shifting attractor landscape causally explains how newly 
encountered significances may interact with existing patterns of inner organization 
to create new global structures for interpreting and responding to stimuli. Now, it 
may well be plausible that a Freeman-esque capacity for bottom-up, large-scale, 
adaptive reconfiguration, avoiding debilitating context-specifying representations, 
will be part of a naturalistic solution to the problem of relevance. But the fact 
remains that the all-important holistic reconfigurations of the attractor landscape 
that are at the heart of things here need to be explained in a way that doesn’t 
smuggle in a magic relevance-detector. In relation to this demand, Dreyfus appeals 
to shifts in attention that are correlated with the pivotal reconfigurations (Dreyfus, 
2008: 360), but this doesn’t seem to do enough work (Wheeler 2010c). For if the 
attentional shift is the cause of a reconfiguration, then the relevance-sensitivity itself 
remains unexplained, since shifts in attention are at least sometimes presumably 
governed by, and so presuppose, sensitivity to what is relevant. But if the attentional 
shift is an effect of the reconfiguration, then we are still owed an explanation of how 
it is that the relevant attractor is the one that is selected. In sum, the account of 
relevance-sensitivity on offer from the perspective of Merleau-Pontian, sense-
making embodiment may well be revolutionary (non-representational, non-
computational) in its implications, but it is dangerously incomplete, because it fails 
to deliver a compelling causal explanation of the phenomenon at issue. Indeed, the 
shortfall here is serious enough that one might wonder whether it constitutes a 
genuine advance over the representationalist alternative.  
 
5. Breaking the Tie 
 
At first sight, the result of our deliberations is an honourable draw, between the 
reformist embodiment of extended functionalism and the revolutionary embodiment 
of the sense-making view. After all, neither has a cast-iron solution to the problem of 
relevance.  At this point, however, what ought to kick in is a perfectly healthy 
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methodological principle regarding theory change in science, namely that we should 
give our support to the competitor theory that requires the less extensive revision of 
our established explanatory principles, unless we have good reason not to; and that 
means that, on the strength of the evidence and arguments considered here, the 
deciding vote goes to extended functionalism, which rejects internalism, while 
maintaining a conception of the body as an implementational substrate for 
functionally specified cognitive states and processes that is comfortingly familiar 
from orthodox representational-computational cognitive science. The right 
conclusion, then, is that the most plausible of the embodied views that we have 
canvassed today is, in a theoretically important sense, the least embodied of them all.   
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